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THE NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR
This paper studies the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) both from a regulatory and more 
theoretical approach, and also from an empirical perspective focusing on the Spanish banking 
sector. A methodology for the estimation of the NSFR based on publicly available information 
is proposed, and the level of the ratio as of 2013 and 2015 across the main Spanish banks is 
estimated. We further analyse the specific balance sheet rearrangement measures undertaken 
by Spanish banks so as to enhance the NSFR, with a special focus on credit supply and 
deposits. Our estimates imply that the average NSFR as of December 2015 is circa 106%, 
and half of the sample banks meet the 100% threshold. Whilst the findings of the paper show 
a disparity of reallocation methods across banks, adjustment towards the NSFR does not 
systematically imply that banks either curtailed lending or increased deposits.
Financial liquidity is of utmost importance in the management of financial institutions. It is 
essential for the preservation of both well-functioning institutions and a sound financial 
system. Liquidity risk can be defined as the risk faced by a bank by which the inability to meet 
short-term financial demands arises. This hazard stems from the failure to convert non-liquid 
assets into cash at the required moment in time and without a loss of capital or income in the 
process [Banks (2014)]. Liquidity risk can be further analyzed by breaking it down into two 
different facets: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk [BIS (2008b)]. The former reflects 
the probability that, due to the lack of funding, an entity either incurs in losses or is obliged 
to the refusal of growth opportunities [BIS (2008b)]. It arises from the failure to meet financial 
obligations when they are due [IMF (2008)] or from the inability to finance additional economic 
needs due to the incapacity to raise cash at short notice [Brunnemeier and Pedersen (2007)]. 
To wit, this aspect of liquidity relates to the fact that outflows are greater than inflows. The latter 
reflects the risk by which an entity is not able to unwind a market position due to the lack of 
market depth, tightness or resilience [Fernández (1999)], or to market imperfections, leading 
to transactions at “fire sale” prices.1 Namely, market liquidity ensures that, should an entity 
need to sell an asset in the market, the transaction can be performed promptly within market 
hours and at market prices implying minimum losses of value [Nikolaou (2009)]. 
Managing liquidity risk is important since excessive risk taking could jeopardise the ability 
of a solvent institution to undertake its main role in maturity transformation and ultimately 
impinge on the robustness of the financial system as a whole and on the real economy 
[Ferguson et al. (2007); Diamond and Rajan (2011); Farhi and Tirole (2012)]. Funding liquidity 
risk is inherent to this central role of banks as intermediaries [BIS (2008a); Silva (2015)], 
since their balance sheets mainly embrace long-term loans, which are funded with short-
term deposits. Should this mismatch not be properly managed, banks could face liquidity 
tensions upon demand from their depositors, given that they do not hold enough liquid 
assets so as to meet these claims. Conversely, holding an important buffer of liquid assets 
could endanger the profitability of the bank since alternative more profitable investment 
opportunities would be missed [Bordeleau and Graham (2010)]. The described trade-off 
highlights the importance of an adequate liquidity risk management, which should lie at 
the cornerstone of any financial institution’s internal management policies. 
1  Market depth is the ability to sustain an important number of market transactions without affecting the price of 
the asset. It usually relates to trading, not in the market as a whole, but within individual securities. Market 
tightness refers to the existence of narrow bid-ask spreads, that is, a market in which strong price competition 
on both the supply and the demand sides results into transaction prices in line with mid-market prices. Finally, 
market resilience implies that price variations from trades are quickly recalibrated and discrepancies in order 
flows are rapidly adjusted. 
Abstract
1 Introduction
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In spite of the aforementioned importance of an adequate control of liquidity risk, the recent 
financial crisis brought to light inefficiencies in the way how banks managed this risk 
[Brunnermeier (2009)]. Firstly, banks felt the shock of a sudden seize up of interbank lending 
markets stemming from asymmetric information [Nikolaou (2009)]: the abrupt increase in interest 
rates had a negative impact on the ability of debtors to repay their loans, which led to significant 
losses on asset-backed-securities, and to a lack of confidence within the markets arising from 
doubts on real exposures of banks to toxic mortgages. Gorton (2008) illustrates how complex 
structures of securities were shaped through successive securitizations of subprime mortgages 
by a long chain of financial intermediaries. This lack of confidence directly impacted the 
interbank market due to doubts on the quality of banks’ assets, resulting on a complete freeze 
of interbank markets, even if the creditworthiness of borrowers had not changed [Brunnermeier 
(2009)]. Alongside with this, the crisis also impacted on investors’ appetite for risk leading to a 
turn towards risk-free investments from non-financial institutions, and consequently impacting 
on the issuance of securities in the wholesale market [Huang and Ratnovski (2011)], up to the 
point that the financial crisis has been labelled a “wholesale crisis” [Gorton (2009)].
Secondly, due to the malfunctioning of these markets, banks had to resort to alternative 
sources in a desperate turn to get liquidity. Those institutions that followed more conservative 
liquidity management policies did not suffer from the described situation since they held 
enough liquid assets so as to service their liabilities when they fell due. Nevertheless many 
institutions, driven by the belief that liquidity was boundlessly obtained in the market, had 
undervalued the potential repercussions of liquidity mismatches incurring mainly in two 
mistakes: the management of liquidity on a daily basis and the maintenance of important 
misalignments between assets and liabilities maturities [BIS (2008b)]. These banks were 
obliged to resort to emergency liquidity from Central Banks [BIS (2010b)], which in turn was 
seen by depositors as a sign of weakness and led to the liquidation of an important number 
of deposits before their maturity. These bank runs further deepened the liquidity shortage of 
banks, and ultimately forced fire sales of their assets, extended fears among investors and 
precipitated additional runs [Diamond and Rajan (1999)]. These actions impinged on profit 
and loss accounts and eventually led initially sound and solvent banks into bankruptcy (as 
already described by Diamond and Dybvig in 1983 when portraying bank runs as “a common 
feature of the extreme crises that have played a prominent role in monetary history”). 
Even though regulators already focused on liquidity risk prior to the crisis, the emphasis lied 
primarily on non-binding recommendations and Pillar 2 measures. Moreover, deposit 
insurance schemes have proven not to be sufficient to limit bank runs and prevent liquidity 
risk and can lead to a freeze in the interbank market [Bruche and Suárez (2010)]. Therefore, 
in the aftermath of the financial turmoil the focus changed towards detailed and binding 
regulations. Specifically, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) recommended 
the adoption of two quantitative standards with the aim of addressing the aforementioned 
lack of an adequate liquidity risk management [BIS (2010a)]: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both ratios were embraced by the European 
Union (EU) through Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR). 
The LCR is in force since October 2015 and tries to ensure that banks hold sufficient liquid 
assets so as to meet net outflows throughout a period of thirty days under stressed 
conditions. The NSFR will come into force on 1st January 2018 and it aims at promoting long 
run resilience, by requiring banks to maintain a minimum level of stable funding.
The purpose of this paper is the analysis of the NSFR, both from a regulatory and more 
theoretical approach, and also from an empirical perspective focusing on the Spanish banking 
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sector. We examine the interdependence between this ratio and the other liquidity standard, 
the LCR, and we find that in the face of the significant connection between both, stemming 
from restructuring strategies that enhance both standards, fulfillment of one ratio does not 
automatic entail fulfillment of the other one. Consequently, even though Spanish banks 
nowadays meet the LCR threshold, compliance with the NSFR does not directly follow and 
we further estimate the current degree of observance across the Spanish banking sector. 
Since the NSFR is not a binding standard yet, institutions do not disclose their level. 
Hence, we introduce a detailed methodology for the approximate calculation of the ratio 
relying on publicly available information. The NSFR is estimated for December 2013 and 
December 2015, covering a sample of banks that comprise twelve of the fourteen 
institutions considered significant within the Single Supervisory Mechanism framework. 
Our findings indicate that the average NSFR as of December 2015 is circa 106%, and half 
of the sample banks meet the 100% threshold at the mentioned point in time, representing 
56% of total bank assets in the Spanish financial system. The results also lay bare that both 
larger and smaller banks – as measured by total assets – maintain on average a level above 
the future Basel requirement, whereas medium size banks do not attain the threshold. 
Moreover, the results suggest that Spanish banks endeavor to enhance their ratios, as 
indicated by the increase in average NSFR from 2013 to 2015 by 11 percentage points. 
The improvement experienced by the estimated NSFR as of December 2015 is specially 
significant taking into account that, in the beginning of the financial crisis in December 
2007 the Spanish banking system showed one of the greatest credit/deposits ratio within 
the euro area, notwithstanding the fact that financing obtained in bond markets presented 
relatively dilated maturities. As a consequence of the seize up of financial markets, it is 
estimated that up to the end of 2012 banks faced difficulties in order to increase the numerator 
of the NSFR, hence adjustments had to be performed via reductions of the denominator as 
loans reached their maturities. From 2012 onwards, while financial markets opened up 
gradually, banks still focused on the shrinkage of the denominator through maturities of 
loans. This paper analyzes the evolution of the ratio in the most recent period , showing an 
estimated improvement of 11 percentage points, as indicated by the average NSFR growth 
from 95% in December 2013 to 106% in December 2015.
Given the upsurge in the ratio, this paper theoretically analyzes the different reallocation 
strategies that institutions could undertake in order to enhance their ratios, and identifies the 
specific measures followed by the sample banks so as to achieve the improvement. Our 
findings disclose a disparity of rearrangement methods across banks, with some institutions 
adjusting through the asset side and some other through the liability side. Given that the 
analysis reveals adjustments by means of reductions in the supply of loans, and in light of 
the critical impact that this side effect could have on the real economy, we further assess 
whether improvements in the NSFR lead to contractions in lending activity. With all the 
caveats related to the use of a small sample, we find that the adjustment towards the NSFR 
does not systematically imply a contraction in credit supply. Enhancement of the NSFR by 
means of increasing deposits is also identified across Spanish banks. Given the impact 
that a potential “war for deposits” could have on banks’ funding costs and on financial 
stability, the relationship between the NSFR and deposits is further assessed. We find that 
enhancements of the NSFR do not necessarily lead to increases in deposits. 
Regulators and the literature have also focused on the analysis of the NSFR from an 
empirical perspective. A detailed study of the NSFR was carried out by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) in 2015, including a description of compliance with the NSFR for a 
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representative sample of banks within the EU and an evaluation of the impact of adjustments 
to compliance on lending. However, the EBA presents the results at an aggregated level, 
hence an analysis of specific institutions cannot be performed. The International Monetary 
Fund also calculates the NSFR for a variety of banks across the globe [Gobat et al. (2014)], 
but regarding Spain only depicts the result of the two larger Spanish banks. To the best of 
our knowledge a detailed study of the NSFR focusing on the Spanish banking sector has 
not been carried out, and this is how this paper will contribute to the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background and introduces the two liquidity ratios and the interactions between them, 
alongside with an analysis of rearrangement measures that banks could embark upon so 
as to enhance the NSFR. In Section 3 we estimate the level of the NSFR across Spanish 
banks, assess the specific reallocation strategies embedded in the enhancement of the 
ratio, and further evaluate the impact of the NSFR on lending activity and on deposits. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
This section presents a view of the current design of the NSFR and the LCR and elaborates 
on the interactions between both liquidity standards, focusing on the implications that 
compliance with one ratio has on the other one alongside with the effect of enhancements 
of one ratio on the other one. 
The aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis brought to light the importance of having a 
framework of prudential regulation centered not only around capital requirements, but also 
around liquidity. As a consequence, the Basel Committee introduced the aforementioned 
liquidity standards in 2010. The final objectives pivoted on relaxing the excessive reliance 
of banks on the wholesale market along with reducing excessive holdings of short-term 
illiquid assets. Both the LCR and the NSFR are designed as complementary ratios, but 
each of them attempts to improve a specific facet of liquidity risk management. 
The LCR was first published by the BCBS in December 2010 as part of the Basel III reform 
package, and afterwards revised in January 2013. In the EU, the LCR was introduced in the 
CRR, but it did not include detailed specifications on the ratio. On 10 October 2014, the EU 
Commission issued a Delegated Regulation on the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, implementing 
article 412(1) of the CRR, which presented detailed guidance on calculations of the ratio 
and timeline of implementation. The Delegated Regulation ruled that the ratio would 
become binding in October 2015 with a minimum requirement of 60%, gradually increasing 
towards the 100% target in 2018, one year ahead of Basel Committee recommendation.
The LCR aims at promoting short-term resilience by requiring banks to hold a stock of 
High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) that will allow them to withstand a money market 
breakdown for a period of thirty days. Namely, it sets the minimum buffer of HQLA that 
banks should maintain in order to meet net expected outflows under stress conditions 
during the mentioned period of time. The ratio is defined as follows:
2  Institutional and 
theoretical background
2.1  UNDERSTANDING 
THE LIQUIDITY RATIOS
2.1.1  Design of the LCR 
and the NSFR
LCR = 100>HQLA
??????????? –
HQLA embraces three categories of assets: Level 1 encompasses assets of the greatest 
quality and the highest level of liquidity, and that can therefore be included in the ratio 
without a limit. Assets such as holdings of sovereign debt or claims against Central Banks 
would be included in this category. Level 2A includes good quality assets, yet less liquid 
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than the previous category. Assets such as covered bonds meeting certain requirements 
or bonds issued by non-financial institutions with credit rating 1 would be included in this 
category. Finally, level 2B comprises other liquid assets such as asset-backed-securities 
or corporate debt with credit rating 2 or 3, which should be capped at 15% of total stock 
of HQLAs. It is also worth mentioning that the amount of level 2 assets should not entail 
more than 40% of total HQLAs. 
Net outflows are intended to measure cash outflows within a thirty-days stress scenario 
minus cash inflows, taking into account that the latter cannot imply more that 75% of total 
expected outflows. Consequently, net outflows are defined as follows:
Net Outflows = Outflows – min (Inflows; 75% * Outflows)
The LCR regulation endeavors to stress the liabilities outflows that the entity could 
potentially face within the previously mentioned period given a severe market scenario. 
For this purpose a range of weights have been defined for the different liability items taking 
into account the source of the funding, the stability and the type of collateral. With the aim 
of making compliance with the LCR less burdensome for banks, liquidity inflows are 
allowed to partially offset cash outflows. This source of liquidity comprises expected cash 
inflows within the next thirty days meeting clearly defined criteria as stated in the Delegated 
Regulation: entities can only consider contractual inflows from exposures that are not past 
due and for which the credit institution has no reason to expect non-performance.
Annex 1 presents a summary of the different assets included in each level of HQLAs along 
with the components of net outflows. 
The second liquidity ratio, the NSFR, was first described by the BCBS in December 2009, 
and it was included in the Basel III agreement in December 2010. Afterwards, in January 2014, 
the BCBS published a consultative document as a revision to the draft published in 2010, and 
a final version of the NSFR agreement was released on 31 October 2014. BCBS intends to 
implement the NSFR as a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. In the EU, the NSFR was 
introduced in the CRR. Specifically, on the basis of articles 510 (1) and (2) of the CRR, the EBA 
reported to the EU Commission in June 2015 proposing a specific methodology for the 
calculation of the NSFR. The Commission, considering the EBA report, is mandated to submit 
a legislative proposal on the NSFR final calibration by 31 December 2016.
The NSFR constitutes a structural measure that aims at fostering longer-term stability by 
incentivizing banks to adequately manage their maturity mismatches by funding long-term 
assets with long-term liabilities. The ultimate goal of this ratio is twofold: on the one hand, 
it tries to guarantee that given a stress scenario the bank has enough stable funding so as 
to continue granting loans, ensuring that the ability of the bank to undertake its main activity 
is not hampered [Domingo (2010)]; on the other hand, it guarantees that the confluence of 
maturities of short-term liabilities and potential advanced maturities of longer-term liabilities 
does not provoke additional market tensions. The ratio is defined as follows:
NSFR = 100>Available Stable Funding
Required Stable Funding –
The Available Stable Funding (ASF) comprises those sources of funding – capital and other 
liabilities – which can be deemed stable over a period of time of one year. The Required Stable 
Funding (RSF) primarily encompasses those assets than can be considered illiquid over the 
above-mentioned period of time, hence needing to be matched with stable sources of funding. 
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The ASF feeds the numerator of the NSFR with different graduations, depending on the 
degree of stability. As previously indicated, at EU level the fine-tuning of the ratio is not yet 
finalized; hence we take the final Basel III framework published in October 2014 as a 
benchmark. The calibration of ASF is accomplished by dividing banks’ capital and liabilities 
into five categories, each of them denoting a specific degree of stability and involving a 
certain percentage. Regulatory capital and liabilities with maturity greater than a year are 
considered the most stable sources of funding, since they imply a permanence in the 
balance sheet superior to the time horizon of the NSFR. Hence, they receive a weight of 
100% in the computation of ASF. As long as deposits are concerned, a similar focus to the 
one embraced in the LCR was taken, applying a weight of 95% to stable deposits and 
90% to less-stable ones. Finally, liabilities that mature within one year require to be 
matched by stable financing at a rate of either 50% or 0%, reflecting the probability of their 
renewal. It is worth mentioning the treatment of repurchase agreements (repos), since the 
assigned weight varies depending on the counterparty: repo transactions carried out with 
a financial institution are deemed completely unstable, hence receiving an ASF weight of 
0%.2 In contrast, the same transaction performed with a non-financial counterparty 
receives a more lenient treatment and enters stable funding with a weight of 50%. 
The RSF is made upon those assets with residual maturity greater than a year along with 
those assets and off-balance sheet activities that can be considered illiquid during the 
time horizon of the NSFR calculation, thus needing to be backed by stable financing. 
Furthermore, it takes into account those short-term assets that should be renewed as part 
of the bank’s financial intermediation role (primarily loans), given that the NSFR safeguards 
banks’ main activities, and granting loans constitutes one of them. Consequently, financial 
institutions’ assets are sorted into eight different categories, each of them entering into 
the NSFR’s denominator with different weights: for instance, whereas cash or claims on 
central bank do not require any stable financing whatsoever, HQLA considered as such for 
the purpose of the LCR receive weights than span from 5% for Level 1 assets to 15% or 
50% for Level 2 subcategories A and B respectively. Insofar as mortgages are concerned, 
they should be mirrored by stable sources up to a percentage of 65% (for high quality 
mortgage loans entailing a risk weight of 35% or less), or 85% (for riskier mortgages 
demanding capital at a rate of 50% or more). On the other side of the spectrum, fixed 
assets or non-performing loans should be 100% backed by long-term sources of funding. 
The treatment of reverse repos should also be pinpointed.3 Similar to the ASF treatment 
for repos studied above, required stable financing depends on the counterparty: reverse 
repos with financial institutions demand 10% or 15% stable funding, whereas non-
financial counterparties require 50%.4
The specific weighting schemes for both ASF and RSF are summarized in Annex 2.
After analyzing the main set-up of the NSFR and the LCR, potential interactions between 
both are assessed. Even though the different objectives sought by both regulatory measures 
were previously highlighted, the implicit interaction between both can be analysed along 
two dimensions:
2  A repo is a transaction by which an entity A sells a security to a counterparty B at a given point in time t = 0, and 
simultaneously agrees to buys the security back from B at a given point in time t = 1. Through this operation, 
which resembles a secured loan granted by B, entity A obtains liquidity. 
3  A reverse repo is the name that a repurchase agreement receives when analyzed from the point of view of the 
buyer of the security (the lender of cash). That is, if entity B buys a security from counterparty A and 
simultaneously agrees to sell it at a higher price at a specific future date, B is said to have concluded a reverse 
repo transaction.
4  Weight of 10% will apply for reverse repos secured against Level 1 assets; weight of 15% otherwise. 
2.1.2  Interactions between 
the NSFR and the LCR
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—  On the one hand, it could be thought that compliance with one ratio automatically 
results into compliance with the other one.
—  On the other hand, it could be believed that improvements of one of them 
positively flow into enhancements of the other one. 
The validity of the first statement is assessed through an example. Given the following 
hypothetical balance sheet, the requirements of each of the items as imposed by the LCR 
and the NSFR can be compared:
seitilibail dna latipaCstessA
06latipaC46ALQH
051 1 year< stisopeD elbatS43hsac - 1 leveL    
    Level 2A - covered bonds 20 Less Stable Deposits < 1 year 75
051 year> stisopeD01serahs detsil – B2 leveL    
04tekram knabretnI
Other liabilities > 30 days & < 1 year 20
Other liabilities > 1 year 10
504504
Non HQLA – Non-performing loans 341
HIPOTHETICAL BALANCE SHEET (EXAMPLE 1) TABLE 1
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
Liabilities
Run-off 
Rates (%)
Contribution
to ASF (%)
Resulting
Net Outfow
Resulting
ASF
060001006latipaC
Stable Deposits < 1 y 150 5 95 8 143
Less Stable Deposits < 1 y 75 10 90 8 68
050001005 1 y> stisopeD
Interbank market 40 100 0 40 0
Other liabilities > 30 d & < 1 y 20 0 50 0 10
Other liabilities > 1 y 10 0 100 0 10
04355504
LCR AND NSFR REQUIREMENTS FOR LIABILITIES (EXAMPLE 1) TABLE 2
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
ASSETS
Contribution
to HQLA (%)
Stable Funding 
Requirement (%)
Resulting
HQLA
Resulting
RSF
46ALQH
    Level 1 34 100 0 34 0
    Level 2A 20 85 15 17 3
    Level 2B 10 50 50 5 5
1430010143 ALQH noN
94365504
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
LCR AND NSFR REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSETS (EXAMPLE 1) TABLE 3
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Table 2 presents the treatment that each of the items of the liabilities side of the balance sheet 
would receive for its consideration as either a potential source of LCR outflows (therefore 
feeding the denominator of the ratio), or as a source of NSFR stable funding (entering the 
numerator as ASF). Columns “run-off rates” and “contribution to ASF” depict a noticeable 
match across most of the weights. Except for the item “other liabilities with residual maturity 
greater than thirty days and less than a year”, the “matching” is clear: the weight imputed as 
contribution to ASF is 100% minus the run-off rate assigned for estimating net outflows. 
Therefore, the regulator has considered that the share that is not imputed as an outflow in the 
LCR should be deemed stable in the NSFR. Taking the simplistic approach that this 
hypothetical bank’s inflows within the next thirty days are zero, net outflows amount to 55, 
therefore requiring the same volume of HQLA so as to meet the LCR. 
Table 3 depicts the treatment of the asset side of the balance sheet, showing the 
contribution of each item towards HQLA (feeding the numerator of the LCR) and towards 
RSF (thus, entering the denominator of the NSFR). The third column shows the contribution 
of each of the levels to total HQLA by applying mandatory haircuts to each of them. The 
fourth column presents the rates at which different assets demand stable funding. Similarly 
to the result illustrated in table 2, a match across the different weights can be observed: 
the share not considered liquid should be tallied with stable financing. Yet, the alignment 
revealed in the weights cannot be translated into an automatic compliance of one ratio 
given observance of the other one. The example lays bare that, even though LCR is greater 
than 100%, the remainder stable financing (amounting 340 as indicated in table 2) presents 
a gap with required stable sources (a total of 349 as shown in table 3), generating a NSFR 
of 97% and thus a shortfall of stable funding even though the LCR is met.5 In the example, 
the gap between ASF and RSF stems from the mentioned mismatch in weights for “other 
liabilities with residual maturity greater than thirty days and less than a year”, which implies 
that stable financing is 10 units lower than required. 
As presented in the previous example, the regulation of both liquidity standards has been 
carefully tailored so as to reach two measures that, despite being conceptually complementary, 
do not entirely condition each other. This flexibility has been achieved by means of attributing 
non-matching weights to specific balance sheet items. Should these weights mismatches 
not have been introduced, the liquidity ratios could have led to an excessive limitation of 
maturity transformation. Taken to the extreme, we could conceive the following situation: a 
financial institution presenting the balance sheet below, with total assets equal to 1, 
composed exclusively of an amount C of cash and a volume L of loans financed by an 
amount E of equity or other stable funding along with a quantity I of interbank borrowing.
5  Albeit the NSFR gap is negative in the example presented, a surplus could arise should the non-HQLA in the 
balance sheet require a lower percentage of stable funding. For instance, if non-performing loans in the asset 
side are replaced by residential mortgages with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the standardised 
approach, stable funding requirement decreases from the previous 100% to 65%, driving the NSFR from 97% to 
148%, thus implying compliance with both the NSFR and the LCR.
EytiuqEChsaC
I knabretnIL snaoL
11latoT
LiabilitiesAssets
HYPOTHETICAL BALANCE SHEET (EXAMPLE 2) TABLE 4
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
NOTE: C = Amount of Cash, L = Amount of Loans, E = Amount of Equity/Stable funding, I = Amount of Interbank borrowing.
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The treatment that this balance sheet would receive under the scope of the NSFR and the 
LCR is the following:
Liabilities Run-off Rates (%)
Contribution to ASF 
(%)
Resulting Net 
Outfow
Resulting ASF
Equity E 0 100 0 E
Interbank I 100 0 I 0
EI1
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
LCR AND NSFR REQUIREMENTS FOR LIABILITIES (EXAMPLE 2) TABLE 5
Assets
Contribution to 
HQLA (%)
Stable Funding 
Requirement (%)
Resulting
HQLA
Resulting RSF
Cash C 100 0 C 0
Loans L 0 100 0 L
LC1
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
LCR AND NSFR REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSETS (EXAMPLE 2) TABLE 6
The resulting LCR would be: 
LCR = = 100%HQLA
??????????
C
I
=
Clearly, if we impose that LCR equals 100% so that the entity complies, it follows that C=I. 
Likewise, the NSFR can be obtained as:
NSFR = = 100%ASF
RSF
E
L
=
If the NSFR is forced to equal 100%, it follows that E = L. Moreover, given that C + L = 1, 
then C = 1 – L. Equally, given that E + I = 1, then I = 1 – E. Therefore, it follows that we 
would have 1 – L = 1 – E and consequently L = E. 
This extreme case shows that, if all the items in the balance sheet received a weight of either 
100% or 0% in each of the ratios, hence considering assets as either entirely liquid or totally 
illiquid and liabilities as entirely stable or fully non-stable, regulators would be forcing to fund 
short-term assets with short-term liabilities (C = I in the example), and longer-term assets with 
stable sources of funding (L = E). Hence, this set-up would jeopardize the main role of banks 
in maturity transformation and would de facto transform banks into a sort of “narrow banking”.6
Fortunately, the introduction of a range of weights from 0% to 100% leaves room for 
maturity transformation while at the same time controlling the degree of maturity mismatch 
between short-term liabilities and longer-term assets. 
6  Narrow banking implies constraining the activity of deposit-issuing banks to the funding of fully safe assets, so as to 
rid depositors of the risk of issuer default [Bossone (2001)]. Therefore, this system entails that the two main functions 
of a bank (deposits taking and granting loans) are performed by two different sets of firms, such as finance companies 
(lending) and banks (deposits). The bank in the above example still develops both activities within a single entity but 
this set-up forces to keep all the funds considered as “unstable funding” in the form of cash. 
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After analyzing the close relationship between both ratios, we further assess the impact 
that enhancements in one ratio have on the other one. Improvements in the LCR could be 
achieved through one of the following strategies:
— Increasing cash inflows by replacing long-term assets with shorter-term ones, 
consequently driving net cash outflow down. The NSFR would be positively 
impacted by this adjustment, through way of diminishing RSF.
— Dwindling cash outflows by impinging on the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet and increasing stable financing. The positive direct effect on the NSFR 
could come from the rise in ASF.
Likewise, the NSFR can be ameliorated through one of the following approaches:
— Increasing ASF, which would derive into an upsurge in the numerator of the 
ratio. In most cases, the LCR would expand through shrinkage in cash 
outflows. 
— Decreasing RSF, primarily by engaging into activities that span across a shorter 
time horizon (for instance, by replacing loans with government bonds). In most 
cases, the LCR would automatically improve through an increasing in HQLA.
Consequently, we might conclude that, even though complying with one ratio does not 
mechanically mean complying with the other one, both requirements are highly 
interconnected and the impact of the implementation of one of them alone will be thus 
similar (albeit not completely equal) to the effect of implementing both of them together. 
The NSFR regulation aims at promoting a more resilient balance sheet structure, and even 
though it does not directly impose a specific configuration in financial institutions’ balance 
sheets, the entry into force of this ratio may indirectly imply rearrangements of banks’ 
strategies and structures. This section elaborates on measures that non-compliant banks 
could undertake in order to meet the standard by 2018, together with potential undesirable 
impacts that these restructuring measures could lead to. 
In order to meet the NSFR target of 100%, financial institutions may choose to modify the 
asset side of their balance sheet, the funding side, or both of them. Moreover, within each 
of these options banks are presented with a variety of paths. In a nutshell, the range of 
options that banks face can be summarized as:
— Adjustment through the asset side by shifting their portfolio towards liquid 
assets by decreasing either loans or other assets with high RSF.
— Adjustment through the liabilities side by changing its funding mix and rising 
long-term debt or retail deposits at the expense of short-term wholesale 
funding.
Enhancements of the NSFR can be achieved by decreasing the denominator of the ratio, 
namely impinging on longer-term assets that require an important volume of stable 
financing. The emphasis being placed on one asset or another other will eventually depend 
on the relationship between each asset’s rate of return and its associated RSF weight [EBA 
(2015a)]. For example, given an asset A that yields a return of 4% and demands 85% stable 
2.2  STRATEGIES THAT CAN 
HELP BANKS COMPLY 
WITH THE NSFR
2.2.1  Adjustment through 
the Asset Side
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funding, and another asset B that yields the same return but demands 65% long-term 
financing, the bank will be inclined to the reduction in asset A and the shift towards B. 
Admittedly, a viable strategy that banks willing to reduce RSF can pursue is the reduction 
of longer-term loans, thus entailing negative effects on lending to the real sector, 
exacerbating the already dried-up lending market and ultimately hampering economic 
growth [Domingo (2010)]. However, the preference for this strategy will depend on the 
aforementioned relationship between returns and RSF weights of longer-term loans versus 
HQLA. The current calibration of the NSFR seems to foster traditional lending activities by 
allowing for a positive gap between required and available sources of funding: a financial 
institution granting mortgages and funding them with equity or stable deposits would 
benefit from a gap between RSF of 65% or 85% (depending on the loan-to-value of the 
mortgage loan) and ASF of 100% or 95% (depending on whether the funding is raised 
through equity or stable deposits). Only if the bank financed these long-term loans with 
short-term market funding, the ratio would involve a negative gap, thus reflecting the 
NSFR’s main goal of funding illiquid assets with stable debt. 
When analyzing the impact of the NSFR on lending activity, an additional disruption can be 
pinpointed. Perotti and Suárez (2011) identify that, given a range of banks that differ only 
on their ability to lend profitably, the NSFR could lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources. The liquidity standard would oblige more-profitable banks, which perform a 
maturity transformation activity to a larger scale and therefore lend more, to reduce short-
term funding, hence pushing lending downwards. On the other side, less-profitable banks, 
for which the NSFR will not be binding due to their lower proportion of both lending and 
short-term debt, will be encouraged, via the equilibrium effect on the expected cost of 
liquidity crises, to increase short-term funding and consequently lending activity.7 
In order to reduce RSF, banks can also focus on decreasing trading book activities, 
especially derivatives, given the high percentage of stable financing that these assets 
demand: NSFR derivative assets net of NSFR derivative liabilities will be subject to 100% 
RSF given that the former is greater than the latter.8 Otherwise, should NSFR derivative 
liabilities be greater than NSFR derivative assets, the net amount would receive an ASF 
weight of 0%. On top of that, an amount of 20% of derivative liabilities (before deducting 
variation margin posted), consume 100% RSF. Regarding initial margin posted, there 
exists an additional requirement of 85% of stable funding. Unlike the previous strategy 
(reducing lending activity), dwindling derivatives trades is in line with the aim of Basel III of 
addressing concerns about the large holdings of short-term non HQLAs such as derivatives 
held by banks before the crisis [Nomura (2014)]. Notwithstanding the regulator’s desire for 
a shift towards HQLAs, increasing the cost of engaging into derivatives activity could lead 
banks to diminishing other investment activities (e.g. if they cannot be hedged at a 
reasonable cost), or to an increase in their risk exposure in case the investments are 
pursued without being tallied by hedging strategies [EBA (2015a)]. 
Not only derivatives, but also investments in other financial assets may be hampered. 
When analyzing the possible shift in investment activity the treatment received by each 
7  Arising from the described distortion, Perotti and Suárez conclude that replacing the NSFR with a liquidity levy 
could avoid those inefficiencies and better adapt to the different business models, by means of allowing more-
profitable banks to increase lending by simply paying a higher tax.
8  NSFR derivative assets are defined as derivative assets minus total collateral posted as variation margin on 
derivative assets. Likewise, NSFR derivative liabilities comprise derivative liabilities minus total collateral posted 
as variation margin on these liabilities.
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type of financial security is key. As previously stated, RSF weights are 5% for Level 1 
assets, 15% for Level 2A securities, and 50% for Level 2B and for non-HQLAs with 
maturity less than a year. These factors may incentivize banks to transfer investment from 
non-HQLAs (entailing higher funding costs) to other categories benefiting from lower 
weights, thus in line with the main goal pursued by the NSFR regulation. This turn towards 
HQLAs could potentially have a negative effect on the real economy: it could result in 
banks reducing their acquisitions of less liquid bonds or equity instruments, thereby 
limiting financing sources for companies aiming at raising funds on capital markets [EBA 
(2015a)]. Additionally, HQLAs’ markets could be impacted by a concentration in the range 
of investors, shifting from a more diversified investor base to a market primarily led by 
banks. This could leave HQLAs’ markets exposed to one-way-risk, especially relevant 
given scenarios of severe tension that could lead to fire sales and have a ubiquitous impact 
on the financial system. On top of that, given the restrictive definition of Level 1 assets, a 
strategy to increase HQLAs could lead to a significant upsurge in demand for public debt 
holdings, potentially resulting into an expansion of government deficits [Toledo (2011)]. 
Ultimately, the extent to which the shift in portfolio composition will take place will hinge upon 
the relative benefits that banks receive from these different types of securities. Given that 
HQLA – especially Level 1 securities – bear a reduced amount of risk, its associated expected 
return will symmetrically be low, hence the shift towards a greater volume of this category 
of securities will depend on the relative savings on funding costs compared to the relative 
losses in expected return. Namely, if the reduction in expected returns between asset 
categories is greater than the reduction in funding costs, the rule will still make riskier 
assets relatively more attractive compared to HQLAs. 
Compliance towards the NSFR target can also be achieved by increasing the numerator of 
the ratio, therefore altering the funding mix of the bank and resorting to more stable 
sources of financing. 
One of the main strategies that a bank can aim at is the increase in the amount of retail 
deposits raised, given the stability granted to this source of funding by the NSFR 
(considered 100% stable if maturing in a period longer than a year; otherwise 95% or 90% 
depending on stability). However, this rearrangement could lead to a “war for deposits”, as 
banks raise the interest rates offered so as to enhance competitiveness in a run towards 
market share. Given the whole spectrum of types of deposits that credit institutions could 
be interested in raising, the combination of the scope of both the NSFR and the LCR 
could foster inclination towards term deposits with maturity higher than thirty days. 
Demand deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than thirty days are 
considered cash outflows, feeding the denominator of the LCR with allocated run-off rates 
of either 5% or 10% (depending on stability), thus driving this ratio down. On the contrary, 
term deposits maturing in a period over thirty days, albeit receiving the same treatment 
within the NSFR (ASF with allocated weights of either 90% or 95% depending on stability), 
do not penalize the LCR since they are not deemed cash outflows. Consequently, liquidity 
regulation could lead to a fight towards term deposits with residual maturity higher than 
thirty days, resulting in interests paid on these deposits increasing above benchmark rates 
compared to shorter dated deposits. 
Alongside with the previously assessed option, banks also face incentives to increase their 
share of funding with maturity greater than a year, since these resources account 100% as 
ASF. However, financial institutions may encounter the problem that, given an important 
upsurge in the offering of long-term bonds by non-compliant banks, investors’ demand is 
2.2.2  Adjustment through 
the Liabilities Side
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not sufficient to accommodate the entire raise. On top of that, a direct consequence of this 
shift is an uptrend in funding costs for financial institutions, which could stem from different 
factors. Firstly, similarly to the issue described when analyzing deposits upsurges, it could 
arise from a potential increase in banks’ demand for longer-term funding, thus driving 
equilibrium yields up. Secondly, it could arise from investors demanding to be compensated 
for the additional credit and liquidity risks that long-term bonds endure when compared to 
shorter-term securities. 
Banks may also drive their NSFR up by altering their strategy regarding repo markets. As 
previously analyzed in subsection 2.1.1, Basel regulation introduces an asymmetric 
treatment for repo transactions depending on whether the counterparty is a financial or 
non-financial institution. This asymmetry implies that the activity of book matching will 
derive into different requirements depending on the counterparty of the transaction: a bank 
engaging into a repo operation with a non-financial corporation and simultaneously signing 
a matching reverse repo with a similar counterparty will not face liquidity requirements, 
since both the ASF from the repo and the RSF from the reverse repo coincide at 50%. On 
the other side of the spectrum, the same matching strategy carried out with a financial 
counterparty, would leave the bank with a net requirement of stable financing of either 10% 
or 15%, given the existing mismatch between the ASF of 0% and the RSF of either 10% or 
15%. Consequently, this could spur traders to turn to non-financial institutions to refinance 
reverse repos. Eventually, this could have a perverse effect on financial institutions’ 
availability of liquidity, since engaging into repo transactions is an important technique for 
banks to generate liquidity. Moreover, the mentioned asymmetry could undermine market-
making activity, since the NSFR could hindrance reverse repos with non-banks, which 
would limit financial institutions’ receptiveness to meet buy orders from clients, and would 
eventually impinge on the liquidity of the underlying security [EBF (2014)]. 
Given the increase in financial institutions’ funding costs arising from the afore-mentioned 
readjustments, combined with a reduction in returns stemming from investments in more 
liquid assets, liquidity regulation could impinge on banks’ profitability. Hence, institutions 
may be incentivized to transfer these additional costs to clients, thus driving loan rates up 
and ultimately impacting on the real sector. Additionally, these extra costs could be offset 
by embracing riskier investment opportunities in a search for higher yield, thereby reducing 
liquidity risk at the expense of other risks. Nonetheless, if liquidity regulation is not 
assessed in isolation but in conjunction with capital requirements this effect is partially 
offset: the decrease in yield due to HQLAs will be partly compensated with lower risk-
weighted-assets and savings in capital requirements, hence alleviating the pure liquidity 
effect [Roger and Vlč ek (2011)]. 
This section aims at providing an overview on the estimated level of the NSFR across 
Spanish banks as of 2013 and 2015, alongside with the rearrangement measures undertaken 
in-between so as to achieve the 2015 figure. 
Based on publicly available information, we proceeded to the calculation of an approximate 
measure of the NSFR for twelve Spanish banks in two separate points in time: 31 December 
2013 and 31 December 2015.
More precisely, the scope of banks in the study encompasses twelve of the fourteen Spanish 
banks considered as significant institutions within the scope of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, as defined in Article 6.4 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential 
3  Empirical analysis
3.1  THE NSFR ACROSS 
SPANISH BANKS
3.1.1  Estimated level of the NSFR
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supervision of credit institutions.9 The logic for the choice of these entities is twofold: they 
account for more than 90% of total assets in the Spanish banking industry (therefore, conferring 
an ample view of the situation of the financial system), and they comprise a sufficiently diversified 
range of banks in terms of size (measured as value of assets). Regarding group level at which 
the calculations have been performed, the study focuses on individual legal entities. Even 
though the obligations laid down by liquidity requirements apply both on an individual and 
consolidated basis – as mandated by Article 6 of CRR –, and in the face of the possible waiver 
on individual application in accordance with Article 8 of CRR, our analysis pivots on the 
individual level for two reasons. First, following the principles for best practices published by 
the Bank of Spain on Memoria de Supervisión Bancaria (2001), and in line with Principle 6 outlined 
in the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (2008), banks 
should actively manage their liquidity not only on a consolidated basis but also at the individual 
level. Second, the analysis at a consolidated level could lead to a distorted view in banks with 
relevant international activity, given that even if a banking group meets the NSFR threshold at 
the consolidated level, this does not necessarily imply that its subsidiaries are individually 
sufficiently protected from liquidity risks. For instance, there could exist legal, regulatory and 
operational limitations to the transferability of liquidity within the group [EBA (2015a)].
The rationale for the determination of the time horizon is the following: the 2013 starting 
period tries to capture a point in time when the NSFR was still not binding, so as to analyze 
banks’ convergence methods towards future compliance. Notwithstanding the BCBS 
publication of the ratio already in 2009, it could not be deemed binding thereupon given that 
the Committee frames guidelines and standards but it does not issue binding regulation 
[Kerwer (2005)]. Only in June 2013, when the CRR was promulgated, European banks were 
reassured that it would become a binding standard. Commencing from that initial point in 
time, the NSFR is calculated up to 2015 so as to analyze rearrangement strategies hitherto, 
using the latest year-end available information. 
Data compilation pivoted on information published on banks’ balance sheets and on the 
notes to the annual accounts. Several assumptions had to be made for certain balance 
sheet items, given that the required level of detail could not be obtained through publicly 
available information – similar issue to the one encountered by the IMF on their NSFR 
Report of 2014 –.10 Since the same hypotheses were consistently applied for the calculation 
of the NSFR across all the banks in the sample, reliable comparisons can be carried out 
albeit each individual ratio may not be completely accurate. Nonetheless, the spirit implicit 
on the BCBS guideline of 2014 was maintained throughout our analysis, broadly capturing 
the liquidity of each category of the balance sheet. 
More precisely, the calculation is underpinned by the following additional adjustments and 
assumptions:
— Regarding sovereign debt, the notes to the annual statements provide 
information on the split between Spanish and foreign sovereign debt, but do 
not further differentiate the precise country issuing the debt. This distinction 
is relevant for the consideration as HQLA, depending on the rating of the 
9   The scope of banks considered includes: Santander, BBVA, Caixabank, Bankia, Popular, Bankinter, Ibercaja, 
Kutxabank, Abanca, BMN, Unicaja and Liberbank. The study does not incorporate Banco Sabadell due to 
information gathering issues. 
10  Due to these assumptions, the ratios calculated may not exactly coincide with the ratios reported by banks to 
the Supervisor or with the BCBS QIS figures. The latter are based on prudential reporting provided to the 
regulator, which entail greater granularity and hinge upon behavioural hypotheses. 
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country. Further information was compiled from the EBA transparency 
exercise of 2015, which reports holdings of sovereign debt per entity and 
country. This data allowed to split foreign sovereign debt into issuers from 
European countries (Level 1 asset, with a RSF of 5%), other 1-rated countries 
(Level 1 asset and RSF of 5%), other countries with a risk weight of 20% 
under the CRR credit risk standardized approach (Level 2A asset and RSF of 
15%) and other countries (non-HQLA and assigned RSF of 100%). 
— As long as corporate debt is concerned, a breakdown depending on the 
rating of the issuer is not available. Hence, the following assumptions were 
taken: corporate debt from Spanish entities was considered 1-rated, thus 
included in the Level 2A basket and treated with a RSF factor of 15%; foreign 
corporate debt, mainly held by Santander and BBVA, was categorized as 
non-HQLA (with associated RSF weight of 100%), supported by the 
assumption that they relate to investments in Latin American companies 
characterized by a feebler creditworthiness arising from the unstable 
economic situation.
— With regard to equity instruments, investments on assets quoted on stock 
exchanges were assumed to be listed on recognized exchanges, thereby 
included in Level 2B and receiving a RSF percentage of 50%.
— Concerning loans and receivables, splits regarding loan-to-value ranges along 
with non-performing assets were extracted from the notes to the financial 
statements, thus no assumptions were needed for those categories. A 
problem of missing information was encounter for other more specific items 
within this category, and they were treated conservatively assuming a maturity 
greater than a year (thus, assigning RSF of 85%). 
— Derivatives were treated on a net basis (derivative assets minus derivative 
liabilities) allocating a RSF factor of 100% if there was a positive net balance, 
and a factor of 0% otherwise.
— Encumbered assets were treated conservatively, assuming that all of them were 
encumbered for a period of a year or more, hence assigning a 100% RSF factor.
— Regarding repos and reverse repos, the European Banking Federation (EBF) 
indicated on its response document to the Basel Consultative Document on 
the NSFR (2014), that repos are mainly contracted with counterparties that are 
cash long and are willing to lend secured to banks, which especially involves 
money market funds, and only to a lower extent banks. Consequently, our 
analysis pivots on the assumption that all repo transactions were performed 
with non-bank counterparts, hence allocating an ASR of 50%. Similarly, the 
EBF states that reverse repos are executed with counterparts that are long in 
the underlying security, which notably includes insurers, asset managers and 
only to a low extent banks. Thereby, in our calculation when no detail 
information was found, all reverse repos were assumed to be executed with 
non-banks counterparts, receiving RSF of 50%. 
— Customer deposits were split between current, term, and savings deposits. 
Demand deposits and term deposits were treated under the hypothesis that 
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all of them were less stable, hence assigning an ASF weight of 90%. In the 
face of the inability to distinguish stable deposits, the most conservative 
option was taken upon as clearly suggested by the BCBS on paragraph 23 of 
the 2014 NSFR report in line with paragraph 80 of the Committee 2013 paper 
on LCR. Savings deposits were assumed to mature in more than one year, 
thus receiving a factor of 100%. 
— Other financial liabilities lacking additional information on type of funding or 
maturity were treated conservatively and assumed non-liquid, allocating an 
ASF factor of 0%. 
For more detailed information, Annex 3 presents the template used for the calculation of 
the NSFR, showing the specific match between each balance sheet category and the 
weights allotted. 
After gathering all the relevant information and introducing the afore-mentioned 
assumptions, the different balance sheet items were further split into more detailed 
categories exploiting information provided on the notes to the annual accounts. Then, 
assets and liabilities were translated into RSF and ASF by applying the weights published 
by the BCBS in 2014 (see weights in Annex 2). The resulting estimated NSFR among the 
main Spanish banks in 2013 and 2015 is presented in the chart below.
Chart 1 depicts that, on average, Spanish banks have made progress in addressing their 
structural net stable funding deficits, with NSFR presenting an upward trend as measured 
by its un-weighted average, which goes from 95% in 2013 to circa 106% in 2015. More 
precisely, half of the twelve banks included in the sample (representing 56% of total assets) 
meet the NSFR requirement at end-2015, most of them presenting an important surplus 
over the required threshold. Four of those institutions already conformed in 2013. The 
remaining six banks display an average shortfall of approximately 20 percentage points, 
thus remaining relatively far from full coverage.11 The NSFR trend among banks with stable 
financing deficit is hectic: a segment of the sample banks experienced a timid improvement 
in their NSFRs in the period observed, whist the other segment deteriorated their ratios 
when compared to 2013. 
11  Even though banks may be referred to as “compliant” and “non-compliant”, it should be noticed that the 
NSFR is not a binding standard yet and it is not expected to come into force until the 1 January 2018.
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A more thorough analysis was carried out categorising the twelve banks in the sample into 
three different groups, clustered together depending on their size as measured by volume 
of assets.12 
Chart 2 sheds light on the divergences in NSFRs that arise from different business models 
depending on banks’ size. The convergence towards the 100% threshold is clearer when 
comparing the system wide weighted average in 2015 with its value in 2013: 109% in 2015 
versus 90% in 2013. Analysis by size cluster depicted in Chart 2 endorses that in 2013 
smaller banks were ahead of its peers in terms of meeting the threshold, presenting an 
average ratio above the 100% target. Medium-sized institutions feature an important 
negative gap in stable financing in 2013; whilst larger banks were on average close to the 
100% target. A different landscape is shown for 2015, when the gap amongst banks was 
heightened: smaller banks continue meeting the standard, but larger institutions position 
themselves far ahead their smaller peers, arising from a strong NSFR growth in the last two 
years. In contrast, medium-sized banks feature a barely perceptible improvement in these 
two years so that NSFR future observance is still a challenge for this group of banks. 
As analyzed in the previous subsection, the Spanish banking system seems to be 
performing reallocation measures so as to comply or improve their NSFRs, as indicated by 
the increase in the average ratio from 95% in 2013 to 106% in 2015. As presented in 
section 2.2 of this paper, banks can resort to a variety of alternatives with the final aim of 
driving their ratios up: increasing stable sources of funding, decreasing assets that demand 
an important share of stable financing, or a combination of both. We further examine the 
specific convergence actions tackled by Spanish banks. For that purpose, we narrow 
down the sample to those banks that experienced an increase in their NSFRs from 2013 
to 2015. The analysis pivots around, not only banks that evolved from not meeting the 
threshold to observing it, but also banks that experienced improvements since the main 
goal of this subsection is the identification of strategies that banks are embarking upon 
towards the target, regardless of the distance to meet the 100% threshold. 
12  Big-sized encompasses banks with a volume of assets at end-2015 greater than 350,000M Euros. Medium-
sized comprises banks with balance sheets between 100,000M and 350,000M Euros. Small-sized includes the 
remaining banks in the sample. 
3.1.2  Rearrangement Measures 
Undertaken to Enhance 
the NSFR
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on public information.
a Weighted by volume of assets at end-2015.
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Chart 3 portrays the percentage growth in NSFR across banks, along with variation in ASF 
and RSF. The first result that is noteworthy is that banks do not follow similar reallocation 
approaches. Whereas some of the banks accomplish the improvement through an increase 
in ASF, the rest of the sample experience a decline in RSF. Yet, when comparing strategies 
by homogeneous groups (Chart 4), it derives that larger banks tend to adjust through the 
liabilities side, whilst medium and smaller banks are more prone to adapt the asset side. 
This different behavior could reflect the stronger positioning of larger banks in the market, 
which allows them to strengthen deposits by deploying more aggressive campaigns, and 
to raise capital and long-term funding quicker and at lower cost. 
We further compare the specific restructuring strategies that underlie the variations in ASF 
and RSF, analyzing the balance sheet items that present the greatest contribution to the 
enhancement of the NSFR ratio. 
As depicted in Chart 5, banks that resorted to the boost in ASF for the enhancement of the 
NSFRs present the common characteristic that an increase in regulatory capital was a driver 
of these improvements. The remaining balance sheet items that bolstered the expansion of 
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on public information.
a The variation relates to the period 2013-2015.
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ASF mainly comprehend deposits, primarily deposits from financial institutions, and to a 
lower extent retail deposits.
Banks that embraced a reduction in RSF as their main strategy exhibit more diverse patterns 
among them. On the one hand, whereas reduction in loans to households seems to be a 
common trend, the specific type of loan affected by the contraction diverges. Some banks 
focused on reducing mortgage loans with loan-to-value greater than 80%; and to a lower 
extent mortgage loans with loan-to-value lesser than 80%. Along with this common 
decrease in loans to households, part of the sample banks also resorted to the diminution 
of loans to credit institutions and impinged on non-performing loans. Encumbered assets 
constitute the final pillar that supports additional savings of RSF. 
As indicated in subsection 2.1.2, the design of the NSFR through the introduction of a 
range of weights from 0% to 100% allows maturity transformation. Nonetheless, this core 
activity of credit institutions could de facto be impinged should banks focus excessively 
on either the reduction of lending activity or the increase in deposits raised with the main 
purpose of enhancing their NSFR. Hence, this section further assesses the impact of an 
increase in compliance with the NSFR on lending activity and deposits.
As previously presented in section 2.2, a possible strategy to enhance the NSFR is the 
migration of the asset side by decreasing lending to the real economy. Moreover, in 
subsection 3.1.2 we observed that this measure was indeed implemented by some 
Spanish banks in the period 2013-2015. Given that one of the main goals of liquidity 
regulation is precisely the avoidance of a credit crunch, it is important to assess whether 
the NSFR is indirectly breaching its own spirit. 
The assessment relies on the graphical analysis presented in Chart 6, which depicts the 
degree of variation in lending activity between 2013 and 2015 for the sample of banks 
introduced in subsection 3.1.1, plotted against the level of NSFR as of December 2013. 
The rationale that supports the analysis is the following: if the Spanish banking sector 
adjusts towards NSFR compliance primarily through the reduction of the supply of loans, 
we would expect to observe how banks that present an important NSFR shortfall as of 
2013 reduce lending activity to a large scale when compared to its peers.
3.2  IMPACT OF THE NSFR 
ON LENDING ACTIVITY 
AND SUPPLY OF DEPOSITS
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on public information.
a The variation relates to the period 2013-2015.
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Chart 6 presents a hectic trend in the evolution of loans when compared to the level of NSFR 
in 2013. Whereas a decrease in lending activity can be observed for some banks not meeting 
the threshold, the degree of loans variation does not seem to present a direct relationship with 
the level of the shortfall (some banks presenting an important NSFR gap reduce loans less 
than other peers). Furthermore, some banks with positive NSFR as of 2013 display shrinkage 
in credit supply. Consequently, with the available evidence we cannot conclude that the 
adjustment towards NSFR systematically entails a contraction in lending activity.
As previously analyzed, another strategy undertaken by some Spanish banks in order to 
improve the NSFR is the increase in retail deposits. Given the negative impact that a 
potential “war for deposits” could have on banks’ funding costs and on financial stability, 
the previous graphical analysis is carried out regarding this balance sheet item. Chart 7 
displays de degree of variation in deposits between 2013 and 2015 for the banks in the 
sample, plotted against the level of NSFR as of December 2013. The rationale of the analysis 
resembles the previous one: banks presenting the greatest NSFR shortfall in 2013 should 
increase deposits more than its peers if there exists a direct relationship between this 
variable and NSFR improvements.
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on public information.
a The variation relates to the period 2013-2015.
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Chart 7 depicts a similar trend in deposits across most of the banks irrespective of the 
level of NSFR as of December 2013. The great majority of credit institutions either 
experienced a drop in deposits or maintained a constant level from 2013 to 2015. Indeed, 
most of the banks with NSFR deficit in 2013 curtailed deposits or experienced a timid 
increase. Hence, evidence shows that given improvement of the NSFR, an upsurge in 
deposits does not automatically derive. 
Consequently, it seems safe to assume that enhancements of the NSFR do not necessarily 
lead to either reduction in lending activity or increase in the supply of deposits.
In this paper we have analyzed the NSFR within the Spanish banking sector. After proving 
that observance of the LCR does not directly imply fulfillment of the NSFR, a methodology 
for the calculation of the latter has been established. The results indicate that banks 
present an average NSFR of 106% as of December 2015, implying that half of the sample 
banks representing more than 50% of total assets meet the future 100% threshold. 
Conversely, the rest of the sample banks show an average ratio of 85%. This shortfall 
could stem from the fact that an alteration of the funding mix is costly and involves a lot of 
time. Given that the final NSFR legal calibration has not been published yet for the 
European Union, some banks may be reluctant to undertake costly restructuring strategies 
till the final gradation is published and the real shortfall estimated. 
Comparison with 2013 figures highlights that the banking system is gradually adjusting 
towards future compliance underpinned by a variety of rearrangement strategies. These 
measures span from an increase in ASF impinging mainly upon regulatory capital and 
long-term deposits, to a decrease in RSF mainly driven by loans to households and non-
performing loans. Albeit the identified strategy of diminishing credit supply, a further 
analysis of the repercussion of the NSFR on lending activity allows us to conclude that the 
enhancement of the NSFR does not necessarily entail a contraction in the supply of loans 
to the real economy. Likewise, the same analysis applied to deposits suggests that the 
adjustment towards the NSFR does not systematically imply an increase in deposits.
We have developed a detailed methodology for the calculation of NSFR relying solely on 
publicly available information. Hence, this study could be useful for investors, who can use 
a similar methodology for the analysis of banks’ positioning in terms of meeting the NSFR 
by 2018. Significant gaps with the required target maintained as the 2018 deadline 
approaches could oblige banks to alter their funding structure, undermining the profitability 
and ultimately hindering their solvency.
4  Conclusions
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Summary of LCR componentsAnnex 1  
SOURCE: Adapted from BCBS on LCR, 2013.
factor ALQHALQH fo tnenopmoC
Level 1 assets
    Coins and bank notes 
    Qualifying marketable securities from sovereigns, central banks, PSEs,
    and multilateral development banks 
    Qualifying central bank reserves 
    Domestic sovereign or central bank debt for non-0% risk-weighted sovereigns 
 )ALQH fo %04 fo mumixam( stessa 2 leveL
    Level 2A Assets
        Sovereign, central bank, multilateral development banks, and PSE assets
        qualifying for 20% risk weighting 
        Qualifying corporate debt securities rated AA– or higher 
        Qualifying covered bonds rated AA– or higher 
 )ALQH fo %51 fo mumixam( stessA B2 leveL    
%57 SBMR gniyfilauQ        
        Qualifying corporate debt securities rated between A+ and BBB– 50%
%05 serahs ytiuqe nommoc gniyfilauQ        
85%
100%
HQLA ANNEX 1.1
?????????????????????????
???????
factor
Retail deposits
  )ytirutam syad 03 naht ssel( stisoped mret dna stisoped dnameD    
        Stable deposits (deposit insurance scheme meets additional criteria) 3%
%5stisoped elbatS        
%01 stisoped liater elbats sseL        
%0 syad 03 naht retaerg ytirutam laudiser hti? stisoped mreT    
 gnidnuf elaseloh? derucesnU
    Demand and term deposits (less than 30 days maturity) provided by small
    business customers: 
%5 %5 stisoped elbatS        
%01stisoped elbats sseL        
    Operational deposits generated by clearing, custody and cash
    management activities 25%
%5 ecnarusni tisoped yb derevoc noitroP        
????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ??? 25%
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ?????
     banks, and PSEs 40% 40%
%02 emehcs ecnarusni tisoped yb derevoc ylluf tnuoma eritne eht fI        
%001 sremotsuc ytitne lagel rehtO    
CASH OUTFLOWS ANNEX 1.2
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SOURCE: Adapted from BCBS on LCR, 2013.
?????????????????????????
???????
factor
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?? ???????????????????? ?????:  
%5stne?lc ssen?sub llams dna l?ateR        
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
????????????? ?????????????????????? 10%/30%
%04no?s??repus la?tnedurp ot tcejbus s?naB        
???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? 40%/100%
%001 se?t?l?caf yt?d?u??l dna t?derc ,sremotsuc yt?tne la?el rehtO        
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????
???? ???
???????? ?
%5-%0 %5-0 ecnan?f edarT        
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? 50%
%001 %001 s?olftuo lautcartnoc lano?t?dda ynA     
%001 s?olftuo hsac e??ta??red teN    
%001 s?olftuo hsac lautcartnoc rehto ynA    
CASH OUTFLOWS (cont’d) ANNEX 1.2
???????????????
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? 0%
????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????y 15%
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
    as a counterparty 25%
%52 B2 le?eL n? no?sulcn? rof elb???le SBMR yb de?caB    
%05 stessa B2 le?eL rehto yb de?caB    
%001 sno?tcasnart ?n?dnuf deruces rehto llA    
 stnemer?u?er lano?t?ddA
?????? ?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????
3 notch
?????????
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????
approach
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s 20%
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? 100%
?????? ?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ??? 100%
???????????????? ?? ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ????????????
?????????????? ????????????????????? 100%
  :.cte ,sV?S ,st?udnoc ,sVIS ,?CBA    
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????? 100%
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? 100%
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SOURCE: Adapted from BCBS on LCR, 2013.
rotcaf swolfnIswolfni hsac fo tnenopmoC
Maturing secured lending transactions backed by the following collateral  
    Level 1 assets 0%
%51 stessa A2 leveL    
    Level 2B assets 
%52 SBMR elbigilE        
%05 stessa rehtO        
%05 laretalloc rehto lla yb dekcab gnidnel nigraM
All other assets 100%
%0 knab gnitroper eht ot dedivorp seitilicaf ytidiuqil ro tiderC
??????? ???????????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
held at centralized institution of network of co-operative banks) 0%
 ytrapretnuoc yb swolfni rehtO
%05 seitrapretnuoc liater morf deviecer eb ot stnuomA    
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 50%
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 100%
%001 swolfni hsac evitavired teN
????????????????????????????
National
Discretion
CASH INFLOWS ANNEX 1.3
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Summary of NSFR componentsAnnex 2
SOURCE: Adapted from BCBS on NSFR, 2014
rotcaf FSAFSA fo stnenopmoC
Total regulatory capital (excluding Tier 2 instruments with residual maturity
of less than one year) 
Other capital instruments and liabilities with effective residual maturity
of one year or more 
Stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits with residual maturity
of less than one year provided by retail and small business customers 95%
Less stable non-maturity deposits and term deposits with residual maturity
of less than one year provided by retail and small business customers 90%
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
corporate customers 
Operational deposits 
Funding with residual maturity of less than one year from sovereigns, PSEs, 
and multilateral and national development banks 
Other funding with residual maturity between six months and less than
one year not included in the above categories, including funding provided by central 
???????????????????????????? ???
All other liabilities and equity not included in the above categories, including liabilities 
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
minority interests) 
NSFR derivative liabilities net of NSFR derivative assets if NSFR derivative liabilities 
are greater than NSFR derivative assets 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
currencies and commodities 
0%
50%
100%
ASF ANNEX 2.1
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SOURCE: Adapted from BCBS on NSFR, 2014.
rotcaf FSRFSR fo stnenopmoC
Coins and banknotes 
All central bank reserves 
All claims on central banks with residual maturities of less than six months 
T??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
commodities
Unencumbered Level 1 assets, excluding coins, banknotes and central bank reserves 5%
?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
paragraph 50, and where the bank has the ability to freely rehypothecate the received 
collateral for the life of the loan 10%
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????
than six months not included in the above categories 
Unencumbered Level 2A assets 
%05 stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenU
HQLA encumbered for a period of six months or more and less than one year 
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
six months and less than one year 
???????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????
All other assets not included in the above categories with residual maturity
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???
to retail and small business customers, and loans to sovereigns and PSEs 
Unencumbered residential mortgages with a residual maturity of one year or more
and with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the standardised approach 
Other unencumbered loans not included in the above categories, excluding loans
????????????????????? ??????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
weight of less than or equal to 35% under the standardised approach 
Cash, securities or other assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts
and cash or other assets provided to contribute to the default fund of a CCP 
Other unencumbered performing loans with risk weights greater than 35% under
the standardised approach and residual maturities of one year or more, excluding
? ????????????????????????? ???
Unencumbered securities that are not in default and do not qualify as HQLA with
a remaining maturity of one year or more and exchange-traded equities 
Physical traded commodities, including gold 
All assets that are encumbered for a period of one year or more 
NSFR derivative assets net of NSFR derivative liabilities if NSFR derivative assets
are greater than NSFR derivative liabilities 
20% of derivative liabilities as calculated according to paragraph 19 
All other assets not included in the above categories, including non-performing
? ?????? ????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
retained interest, insurance assets, subsidiary interests and default securities
65%
85%
100%
0%
15%
50%
RSF ANNEX 2.2
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 91 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 31
Template used for the calculation of the NSFRAnnex 3
rotcaf FSRtnenopmoc RFSNstessA
%0sknab lartnec no smialc dna snioCsknab lartnec htiw secnalab dna hsaC 1
  gnidart rof dleh stessa laicnaniF 2
    2.1  Loans and advances to credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
   seitiruces tbeD 2.2    
%5stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUsknaB lartneC morf seitiruces tbeD           
%5stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUtbed cilbup hsinapS           
           Other public debt Unencumbered Level 1 assets/Unencumbered Level 2A 
assets/Non-HQLA
5%/15% 
/100%
           Debt securities from Spanish credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
           Debt securities from other credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
           Debt securities from corporations Unencumbered Level 2A assets/Non-HQLA 15%/100%
   stnemurtsni ytiuqe rehtO 3.2    
           Equity from Spanish credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
%05stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc hsinapS morf ytiuqE           
           Equity from other credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
%05stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc rehto morf ytiuqE           
%001stessa rehtOsdnuf egdeh ni noitapicitraP           
%001)seitilibail sevitavired fo ten stessa sevitavired( stessa rehtO sevitavired gnidarT 4.2    
Memorandum item: Loaned or advanced as collateral %001stessa derebmucnE
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
    3.1  Loans and advances to credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months
%5  seitiruces tbeD 2.3    
%5stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUsknaB lartneC morf seitiruces tbeD           
stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUtbed cilbup hsinapS           5%/15% 
/100%
           Other public debt Unencumbered Level 1 assets / Unencumbered Level 2A 
assets / Non-HQLA 15%
           Debt securities from Spanish credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
           Debt securities from other credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%/100%
 ALQH-noN/stessa A2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc morf seitiruces tbeD           
%51  stnemurtsni ytiuqe rehtO 3.3    
           Equity from Spanish credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 50%
%51stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc hsinapS morf ytiuqE           
           Equity from other credit institutions ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 50%
%001stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc rehto morf ytiuqE           
%001stessa rehtOsdnuf egdeh ni noitapicitraP           
Memorandum item: Loaned or advanced as collateral  stessa derebmucnE
ASSETS ANNEX 3.1
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rotcaf FSRtnenopmoc RFSNstessA
   STESSA LAICNANIF ELAS-ROF-ELBALIAVA 4
%5  seitiruces tbeD 1.4    
stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUtbed cilbup hsinapS       
    
5%/15%
/100%
           Other public debt Unencumbered Level 1 assets/Unencumbered Level 2A 
assets/Non-HQLA 100%
           Debt securities from Spanish credit institutions ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????
maturity of 1 year or more ) 15%
           Debt securities from other credit institutions ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????
maturity of 1 year or more ) 15%/100%
 ALQH-noN/stessa A2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc morf seitiruces tbeD           
%05  stnemurtsni ytiuqe rehtO 2.4    
%05stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitutitsni tiderc hsinapS detsil morf ytiuqE           
%001stessa B2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitutitsni tiderc detsil rehto morf ytiuqE           
%001stessa rehtOsnoitutitsni tiderc detsil-non rehto morf ytiuqE           
Memorandum item: Loaned or advanced as collateral  stessa derebmucnE
  selbaviecer dna snaoL 5
    5.1  Loans and advances to credit institutions  
           Reciprocal accounts ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????
maturity of 1 year or more ) 100%
           Demand deposits ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
maturity less than 6 months 15%
%05snoitutitsni laicnanif-non hti? tnemeer?a esahcruper esreveRstnemeer?a esahcruper esreveR           
???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????
maturity of 1 year or more ) 100%
%001)snaol ?nimrofrep noN( stessa rehtOstessa deriapmI           
    5.2  Loans and advances to other debtors  
 snaol deruces e?a?troM           
 e?a?trom laitnediseR               
%56%53 naht re?ol AWR e?a?trom laitnediseR)%53 led AWR( %08 ot lauqe ro naht ssel VTL                   
%58%53 retaer? AWR e?a?trom laitnediseR)%05 fo AWR( %08 revo VTL                   
   deriapmI :hcihw fO                       
%001snaol ?nimrofrep noN %08 ot lauqe ro naht ssel VTL                   
%001snaol ?nimrofrep noN %08 revo VTL                   
%58%53 retaer? AWR e?a?trom laitnediseRe?a?trom laicremmoC               
           Other secured loans ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
           Other loans ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
           Credit accounts ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
           Commercial credit ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
%05raey 1 naht ssel ytirutam laudiser hti? stessa rehtOdnamed no elbavieceR           
%05raey 1 naht ssel ytirutam laudiser hti? stessa rehtO sdrac tiderC           
           Finance leases ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????
????????????????? 85%
%001snaol ?nimrofrep noNstessa deriapmI           
ASSETS (cont’d) ANNEX 3.1
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rotcaf FSRtnenopmoc RFSNstessA
  seitiruces tbeD 3.5    
%5stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUtnemnrevoG           
           Credit institutions ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????
maturity of 1 year or more) 100%
%001/%51ALQH-noN/stessa A2 leveL derebmucnenUsrotces rehtO           
Memorandum item: Loaned or advanced as collateral %001stessa derebmucnE
 stnemtsevni ytirutam-ot-dleH 6
%5stessa 1 leveL derebmucnenUtbed cilbup hsinapS    
    Debt securities from Spanish credit institutions ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????
maturity of 1 year or more) 100%
%51stessa A2 leveL derebmucnenUsnoitaroproc hsinapS morf seitiruces tbeD    
%001stessa rehtOsnoitaroproc rehto morf seitiruces tbeD    
Memorandum item: Loaned or advanced as collateral %001stessa derebmucnE
7  Changes in the fair value of the hedged items in portfolio 
hedges of interest rate risk %001
stessa rehtO
%001)seitilibail sevitavired fo ten stessa sevitavired( stessa rehtO sevitavired gnigdeH 8
%001stessa dexiF elas rof dleh stessa tnerruc-noN9
%001stessa rehtOstnemtsevnI 01
%001stessa ecnarusnI snoisnep ot deknil stcartnoc ecnarusnI11
%001stessa dexiF stessa elbignaT 21
%001stessa dexiF stessa elbignatnI 31
%001stessa rehtO stessa xaT 41
%001stessa rehtO stessa rehtO 51
SOURCE: ??? elaboration.
ASSETS (cont’d) ANNEX 3.1
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rotcaf FSAtnenopmoc RFSNytiuqe dna seitilibaiL
   gnidart rof dleh seitilibail laicnaniF  1
%0stessa sevitavired htiw ten deredisnoC sevitavired gnidarT .1.1    
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ?? A/N
A/N
   tsoc dezitroma ta seitilibail laicnaniF  3
    3.1  Deposits from central banks Funding from central banks with residual maturity greater than 
1 year 0%
   snoitutitsni tiderc morf stisopeD  2.3    
           Reciprocal accounts ??????????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????
than 1 year 50%
           Deposits with agreed maturity ??????????????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????
greater than 1 year 100%
           Other accounts ??????????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????
than 1 year 50%
%0snoitutitsni laicnanif htiw tnemeerga esahcrupeRstnemeerga esahcrupeR           
  stisoped remotsuC  3.3    
           Government and other government agencies Funding with residual maturity of less than one year provided 
?????????????????????????? 50%
%09raey 1 naht ssel ytirutam laudiser htiw stisoped dnameDstnuocca tnerruC           
%001 raey 1 retaerg stisoped smreTstnuocca sgnivaS           
%001 raey 1 retaerg stisoped smreTstnuocca mret-dexiF           
%05snoitutitsni laicnanif-non htiw tnemeerga esahcrupeRstnemeerga esahcrupeR           
????????????????????????????????????????? Funding with residual maturity of less than one year provided 
?????????????????????????? 50%
%0seitilibail rehtO seitilibail laicnanif rehtO  5.3    
4  Changes in the fair value of the hedged items in portfolio
Hedges of interest rate risk
%0
seitilibail rehtO
%0stessa sevitavired htiw ten deredisnoC sevitavired gnigdeH  5
  elas rof dleh stessa tnerruc-non htiw detaicossa seitilibaiL   6
%0seitilibail rehtO snoisivorP  7
%0seitilibail xaT seitilibail xaT8 
%0seitilibail rehtO seitilibail rehtO  9
%001latipac yrotaluger latoTlatipac yrotaluger latoT  01
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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